2016考研英語閱讀熱點：歐元區和希臘說分手不容易

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The outbreak of the first world war was, we are told,greeted with confidence and jubilation by thepeoples of Europe. Something similar seems to behappening after years of economic crisis and politicalturmoil in Greece. A growing number of people feelthat enough is now enough. The strident viewsexpressed in these pages by the Italian economist,Francesco Giavazzi, **are shared by many in highoffice. Meanwhile, Alexis Tsipras, the Greek primeminister, accuses Greece’s creditors of “pillaging” hiscountry.

據說，一戰爆發時，歐洲各國民眾自信而喜悅地歡呼這個消息。在經過多年的希臘經濟危機和政治動蕩之后，現在似乎在發生類似的事情。越來越多的人覺得，情況已忍無可忍。意大利經濟學家弗朗西斯科•賈瓦齊(Francesco Giavazzi)在本報表達的尖銳觀點，在高層引發了很多同感。與此同時，希臘總理亞歷克西斯•齊普拉斯(Alexis Tsipras)指責希臘債權人“掠奪”他的國家。

Olivier Blanchard, the International Monetary Fund’s sober chief economist, indicates that a dealmight still be reached. But many are beginning to long to see the knot cut. Whatever game theGreeks thought they were playing, their government may now just desire an end to thehumiliation. Similarly, whatever game the eurogroup may have been playing, it may now justwant an end to the frustration. If so, Greek default, exit and devaluation could be fairly close.

國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)一向頭腦清醒的首席經濟學家奧利維爾•布蘭查德(Olivier Blanchard)暗示，仍有可能達成協議。但許多人開始渴望看到割斷這段“孽緣”。無論希臘人之前認為他們在玩什么游戲，希臘政府也許現在只想結束這種羞辱。同樣，無論歐元集團此前在玩何種游戲，它也許現在只想結束這種挫敗感。若果真如此，希臘違約、退出歐元區和貨幣貶值可能就為時不遠了。

Would euphoria then last? I fear not. The assumption of some in the eurozone is not onlythat the Greek case is unique, but that the disaster those sinners so deserve would improvethe behaviour of everybody else. But the currency union would also no longer be irrevocable.New crises will occur. When they do, confidence in the union would be less than complete aftera Greek exit. The programme of Outright Monetary Transactions, announced by the EuropeanCentral Bank in 2012, might need to be implemented, to calm nerves. But it could fail. Self-fulfilling speculation could force even more divorces.

那么各方的爽快感將會持續嗎?恐怕不會。歐元區的一些人不僅假設希臘的情況是獨特的，而且還假設，讓那些罪人嘗一嘗他們應得的苦難，將會改進其他人的行為。但歐洲貨幣聯盟也將不再是不可逆轉的。新的危機將會爆發。希臘退出后，危機爆發時人們對貨幣聯盟的信心將打折扣。歐洲央行(ECB)可能需要實施其2012年宣布的“直接貨幣交易”(Outright Monetary Transactions, OMT)計劃以安撫緊張情緒。自我實現的猜測可能迫使更多國家退出歐元區。

Some argue that Greece at least would be far better off after a default and exit. It is indeedtheoretically possible that a default to its public creditors, combined with introduction of a newcurrency, a big devaluation (accompanied by sound monetary and fiscal policies),maintenance of an open economy, structural reforms and institutional improvements wouldmark a turn for the better. Far more likely is a period of chaos and, at worst, emergence of afailed state. A Greece that could manage exit well would have also avoided today’s plight.

一些人辯稱，在違約和退出歐元區之后，至少希臘本身的日子會好過得多。的確，從理論上說，對公共債權人違約，再加上發行新貨幣，貨幣大幅貶值(伴隨穩健的貨幣和財政政策)、保持經濟開放、結構性改革和制度改進，將有可能帶來局面好轉，但更有可能出現的情形是一段時期的混亂，最糟糕的情況是希臘淪為一個失敗國家。如果希臘能夠管理好退歐，那么它根本就不至于陷入今日的困境。

Neither side should underestimate the risks. It is also crucial to avoid the contempt socharacteristic of the frayed nerves caused by failing negotiations.

雙方都不應低估風險。同樣關鍵的是，要避免談判失敗往往導致的蔑視情緒。

Fecklessness may be a grievous fault, but grievously have the Greeks answered it. As the Irisheconomist, Karl Whelan, points out in a blistering response to Mr Giavazzi, the Greek economyhas suffered a staggering collapse. From peak to trough, aggregate real gross domesticproduct fell by 27 per cent, while real spending in the economy fell by a third. The cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance improved by 20 per cent of GDP between 2009 and 2014 and thecurrent account balance improved by 16 per cent of GDP between 2008 and 2014.?? Theunemployment rate reached 28 per cent in 2013, while government employment fell by 30 percent between 2009 and 2014. Such a brutal adjustment would have shredded the politics ofany country. (See charts.)

無能也許是一個嚴重的過錯，但希臘人已經做出了慘烈的應對。愛爾蘭經濟學家卡爾•惠蘭(Karl Whelan)在犀利回應賈瓦齊的觀點時指出，希臘經濟遭受了令人愕然的崩盤。從峰值到谷底，總體實際GDP下降27%，而經濟中的實際支出下降三分之一。從2009年到2014年，經周期調整的財政平衡改善幅度相當于GDP的20%，從2008年到2014年，經常賬戶平衡改善幅度相當于GDP的16%。失業率在2013年達到28%，而從2009年到2014年政府雇員人數下降30%。如此無情的調整會撕裂任何一個國家的政治。(見圖表)

Europeans are now dealing with Syriza because of this calamity. But they are also dealingwith Syriza because of the refusal to write down more of the debt in 2010. This was a hugeerror, made far worse by the subsequent collapse of the Greek economy. Indeed, the vastbulk of the official loans to Greece were not made for its benefit at all, but for that of itsfeckless private creditors. Creditors, too, have a duty to take care. If they are careless, theyrisk big losses. If governments want to save them, their own taxpayers should be told to payup.

歐洲現在與齊普拉斯打交道，原因之一就是這場災難。但另一個原因是，債權人在2010年拒絕減記更多債務。那是一個巨大的錯誤，希臘經濟隨后的崩塌讓這個錯誤更為糟糕。實際上，很大一部分發放給希臘的官方貸款根本不是為了希臘的利益，而是為了讓無能的私營部門債權人全身而退。債權人也有注意義務。如果他們不小心，就可能面臨巨額虧損。如果政府想挽救他們，這些國家的納稅人應當被告知要買單。

Greece has also already made significant reforms, including to its pension arrangements andbusiness environment. But backtracking on such reforms would indeed be a huge mistake, asthe eurogroup and IMF argue.

希臘也已實施了重大改革，包括對養老金安排和商業環境的改革。但就像歐元集團和IMF所主張的那樣，逆轉此類改革將是一個巨大錯誤。

Given all this, it is tragic that the breakdown might occur now, after so much pain has alreadybeen suffered. It is not too late to reach agreements aimed at promoting reform, minimisingadditional austerity and making debt manageable. That would also be in everybody’s long-term interest. The parameters of such a deal are also clear: a small primary surplus in theshort run, a decision by the eurozone to pay off the IMF and the ECB, accompanied by long-term debt relief, and a strong commitment to bold structural reforms by the Greekgovernment.

考慮到這一切，希臘在已經經受了這么多痛苦之后，現在退出歐元區是可悲的。現在達成協議(旨在推動改革，最小化額外緊縮措施，以及讓債務變得可控)還不算太晚。這也符合各方的長遠利益。這種協議的大框架也相當明晰：短期內實現小額基本預算盈余、歐元區決定償還IMF和歐洲央行的貸款(伴隨長期債務減免)，以及希臘政府堅定承諾推行大膽結構性改革。

Whether it likes it or not (understandably, it does not) the European Central Bank is a centralplayer. It will have to decide when it can no longer treat the credit of the Greek government ascollateral against emergency liquidity assistance to Greek banks. If Greece cannot reach adeal on the release of funds, the ECB seems likely to cut the banks off. That would thentrigger controls on withdrawals. This might be accompanied by a scheme for circulation ofdeposit receipts, or ultimately by messy introduction of a new currency.

不管喜歡與否(可以理解的是，它不喜歡)，歐洲央行都扮演著中心角色。它將必須決定，何時不再將希臘政府的債券視為向該國銀行提供緊急流動性援助的抵押品。如果希臘無法就紓困資金的發放達成協議，歐洲央行似乎可能會切斷希臘銀行的資金。這進而會觸發對儲戶提款的限制。伴隨而來的可能是一個存單流通機制，或者最終在混亂之中引入一種新貨幣。

Right now, however, the aim must still be to cool down and secure a deal. Yet, in the currentmood of anger and recrimination, reaching one now seems ever more unlikely. That would notbe the end of the story, however. Europeans will be unable to walk away. Whether Greece staysinside the euro or leaves, much the same challenges will arise. The Europeans would still have toadmit that they would not get much of their money back; and they would still have to helpavoid a Greek collapse.

然而，當前的目標必須仍是冷靜下來，達成協議。然而，在目前憤怒和相互指責的氣氛下，達成協議似乎越來越難。然而這并非故事的結局。歐洲將無法轉身離開。不管希臘是否留在歐元區，同樣的挑戰仍會出現。歐洲人仍不得不承認，他們提供的很大一部分資金將收不回來;而且他們仍不得不幫助希臘避免崩潰。

It might be a relief to divorce a difficult partner. But the partner will still exist, even after thismonetary marriage is over. Greece will remain strategically located and even inside the EU.Neither the Greeks nor their partners should imagine a clean break. The relationship willcontinue. It will just be poisonous. If, tragically, that fate cannot be avoided, it will have to bemanaged for a very long time.

與一位很難相處的伴侶離婚可能會讓人解脫。但這位“伴侶”仍將存在，甚至在貨幣聯姻結束以后也是如此。希臘的地理位置仍將具有戰略意義，即使在歐盟內部都是如此。希臘及其伙伴們都不應指望干凈利落的一刀兩斷。他們的關系仍將繼續，只是這種關系將是有毒的。如果不幸無法避免這種命運，他們就不得不長期把握這種關系。